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Abstract
A salient if under researched feature of the new age of global inequalities is the rise to prominence of entrepreneurial phi-
lanthropy, the pursuit of transformational social goals through philanthropic investment in projects animated by entrepre-
neurial principles. Super-wealthy entrepreneurs in this way extend their suzerainty from the domain of the economic to the 
domains of the social and political. We explore the ethics and ethical implications of entrepreneurial philanthropy through 
systematic comparison with what we call customary philanthropy, which preferences support for established institutions 
and social practices. We analyse the ethical statements made at interview by 24 elite UK philanthropists, 12 customary and 
12 entrepreneurial, to reveal the co-existence of two ethically charged narratives of elite philanthropic motivations, each 
instrumental in maintaining the established socio-economic order. We conclude that entrepreneurial philanthropy, as an 
ostensibly efficacious instrument of social justice, is ethically flawed by its unremitting impulse toward ideological purity.
Keywords Entrepreneurial philanthropy · Ethics · Inequality · Neo-liberalism · Philanthrocapitalism · Rhetoric of 
motivations
Introduction
A salient if under researched feature of the new age of global 
inequalities is the rise to prominence of entrepreneurial 
philanthropy, the pursuit of transformational social goals 
through philanthropic investment in projects animated by 
entrepreneurial principles (Bishop and Green 2009; Diet-
lin 2010). The work of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foun-
dation in striving to eradicate diseases like malaria and 
polio is emblematic of a much wider social movement of 
super-wealthy entrepreneurs to combat poverty and other 
manifestations of injustice prevalent in both developed and 
developing countries (Callahan 2017; McGoey 2015). The 
doctrine of entrepreneurial philanthropy, first articulated by 
Carnegie in what became known as The Gospel of Wealth 
(1889), is argued to matter more now than ever before 
because it offers mitigation for the worst excesses of “win-
ners takes all” capitalism (Acs 2013; Giridharadas 2019). In 
recycling large fortunes in their own lifetimes, philanthropic 
entrepreneurs bring capital and expertise to bear in tackling 
deep-seated social problems, helping disadvantaged oth-
ers help themselves while arresting the politics of envy and 
healing social divisions (Harvey et al. 2011).
Entrepreneurial philanthropists make large ethical claims. 
A banner on the Gates Foundation website proclaims that 
“all lives have equal value” and that the organization is led 
by “impatient optimists working to reduce inequity” (Gates 
Foundation 2018). Technology entrepreneur Mark Zucker-
berg and his wife, Priscilla Chan, assert that there can be 
a “future for everyone” by applying technology to “help 
remove systemic barriers that limit individual progress” 
(Chan Zuckerberg Initiative 2018). Investor Christopher 
Hohn and his former spouse Jamie Cooper promote “bold 
solutions to seemingly intractable challenges for children 
and adolescents in developing countries” because “every 
child deserves to survive and thrive today and in the future” 
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(CIFF 2018). Inspiring statements such as these, expressive 
of the ambitions of entrepreneurial philanthropy, are ethi-
cally highly charged. The assertion that all lives have equal 
value is foundational to much ethical thinking (Nagel 1970; 
Rawls 2001; Singer 2011) and influential writings on trans-
national solidarity and social justice (Gould 2007; Sandel 
2010; Sen 2009).
Yet, notwithstanding its claims to virtue and efficacy, 
entrepreneurial philanthropy has been subject to widespread 
criticism, challenging the large claims made by proponents. 
Five main concerns have been raised. First, in directly pur-
suing solutions to complex social problems, entrepreneurial 
philanthropy inevitably extends the suzerainty of wealthy 
entrepreneurs from the domain of the economic to those of 
the social and political (Aschoff 2015; Ball 2008; Su and 
He 2010; Villadsen 2007), widening the “empowerment 
gap” between power brokers and ordinary citizens who 
“already feel shoved aside by elites and the wealthy” (Cal-
lahan 2017, p. 9). Second, that this process is encouraged 
by generous tax breaks on charitable giving is felt by critics 
to add insult to injury (Reich 2011), increasing the power of 
private foundations, described by Reich (2016, p. 67) as “the 
most unaccountable, non-transparent institutional form” in 
democratic societies. This leads Horvath and Powell (2016, 
p. 116) to question the role of entrepreneurial philanthropy 
in “reshaping government by inserting itself as a preferred 
provider of public goods”, eroding democracy and creating 
“a tension between philanthropy and the ideal of equality” 
on which it rests (Pevnick 2016, p. 227). Third, while erod-
ing support for government spending on social goods and 
services (McGoey 2015, p. 8), entrepreneurial philanthropy 
unfairly shifts the burden of alleviating poverty onto the poor 
themselves by promoting self-help poverty action, failing 
to recognize that poverty is a consequence of the dynam-
ics of capitalism (Kohl-Arenas 2016). Fourth, by funding 
market-based solutions to social ills, entrepreneurial phi-
lanthropists make things worse by reinforcing the structural 
determinants of poverty (Edwards 2011; Herro and Obeng-
Odoom 2019; Roy et al. 2016). Fifth, and most insidious, 
entrepreneurial philanthropists directly profit from their 
“generosity” by expanding the reach of markets, creating 
new opportunities for profit, and legitimizing the existence 
of extreme inequalities in income and wealth (Aschoff 2015; 
Eikenberry and Mirabella 2018; McGoey 2012; Nickel and 
Eikenberry 2009).
Notably, however, these criticisms typically are made 
without reference to the espoused ethical motivations of 
the philanthropic elite, despite the recent emergence of 
the ethics of philanthropy as a vigorous field of academic 
enquiry (Illingworth et al. 2011; MacAskill 2015; Singer 
2009, 2015; White 2018; Woodruff 2018). While there 
are numerous studies of strategic corporate philanthropy 
(Gautier and Pache 2015; McAlister and Ferrell 2002; 
Porter and Kramer 2006), there are very few empirical 
studies of the ethics of philanthropic elites; of the values 
and ideas wealthy people claim motivate and direct their 
philanthropic interventions and commitments (Schervish 
2005). We address this lacuna in what follows through 
an interpretive enquiry based on life-history interviews 
with 24 prominent members of Britain’s philanthropic 
elite, 12 customary and 12 entrepreneurial philanthropists, 
building on prior research suggesting how entrepreneurial 
philanthropy differs crucially from the longer established 
practice of customary philanthropy (Harvey et al. 2019). 
The distinction between customary and entrepreneurial 
philanthropy elaborated in Table 1 is consistent with that 
made between “contributory” and “disruptive” philan-
thropy by Horvath and Powell (2016, p. 89). On the one 
hand, customary philanthropy is seen to preference sup-
port for established institutions and social practices in the 
ancient tradition of alms giving, relieving the suffering of 
the poor and disadvantaged and nurturing valued organiza-
tions and institutions (Bell et al. 2012). On the other hand, 
entrepreneurial philanthropy is seen as more revolutionary, 
striving to transform society by solving social problems 
through concentrated investment behind radical theories of 
change (Rogers 2014). In what follows, we ask how, why 
and with what effects do customary and entrepreneurial 
philanthropists respectively express, explain and justify 
their espoused ethical motivations?
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In 
the next section, we draw selectively on the literature on 
ethics to shed light on fundamental differences between 
the customary and entrepreneurial modes of elite philan-
thropy. We then explain our methodology and research 
procedures. In the subsequent section, we present and 
interpret our findings on the espoused ethical motivations 
of customary and entrepreneurial philanthropists. The 
implications are then discussed, limitations acknowledged, 
and conclusions drawn.
Table 1  Two modes of philanthropic practice
Parameter Philanthropic mode
Customary Entrepreneurial
Objectives Ameliorative Transformational
Strategy Opportunity driven Theory-of-change 
driven
Project selection Responsive Proactive
Investment decisions Subjective Objective
Project management Limited engagement Extensive engagement
Partnerships Low commitment High commitment
Project evaluation Qualitative Quantitative
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Ethics and Philanthropy
The earliest ideas on philanthropy can be traced back to 
Ancient Greece where the term philanthropos was equated 
with love of mankind (Bishop and Green 2009, pp. 21–23). 
Aristotle identified philanthropy with virtue in enabling 
elites to justify their special place in society by supporting 
local communities (Hursthouse and Pettigrove 2018; White 
2018). This view has echoed down the centuries. In the dom-
inant narrative of philanthropy, the rich “generously” express 
solidarity with the poor by voluntarily supporting causes and 
institutions that benefit entire communities (Ostrower 1997). 
In this way, differentials in income and wealth are made 
more palatable and communities more cohesive (Breeze and 
Lloyd 2013, pp. 107–116). Only in recent times, however, 
has the dominant narrative of philanthropy been subject to 
rigorous critical review, challenging its efficacy as a vehi-
cle for social justice (Ashford 2011, 2018; Eikenberry and 
Mirabella 2018; Kohl-Arenas 2016; McGoey 2012; Reich 
2017; Roy et al. 2016). Peter Singer (2009, 2015) and other 
writers on effective altruism (MacAskill 2015), have been 
especially vocal in arguing from a utilitarian perspective that 
present-day philanthropy is both inadequate, insufficiently 
beneficent, and misdirected.
Ethics and Customary Philanthropy
Customary philanthropy is rooted in deontology, an ethical 
framework that suggests people engage in philanthropy out 
of a sense of duty to extend beneficence to those in need. The 
starting point is individual beliefs relating to the rightness or 
wrongness of particular behaviours (Shaw et al. 2016). The 
first formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative posits that 
the principle on which a person decides to act should in their 
view have universal application, as a law of nature, avoiding 
subjective variations in practice. In the second, less abstract, 
formulation, we are enjoined to respect ourselves and oth-
ers equally, treating people always as an end, caring about 
their well-being selflessly, not simply as a means to an end 
(Audi 2010, pp. 57–58). Kant argues that the morality of an 
act is determined by motivation, not consequences, because 
good will is fundamental to virtue (Paton 1948). This chimes 
with Ostrower’s (1997, p. 12) observation that “elite phi-
lanthropists live in a milieu in which giving is the norm 
… part of their privileged position.” The choices made by 
socially embedded individuals are thus not solely dependent 
on beliefs, but also on institutional norms and relations with 
others (Davis and McMaster 2015). As such, philanthropy 
should be respectful of institutions in distributing power and 
regulating the rights of individuals.
Rawls (2001) argues that the distributive effects of institu-
tions are crucial in assigning rights and duties to individuals 
in society. Income, wealth and status inequalities invariably 
impact on the life prospects of individuals. Inequalities, 
however, might be justified within a customary institutional 
context that supports equal liberty and equality of oppor-
tunity. Moreover, envy arising from inequalities might be 
mitigated by that “plurality of voluntary associations within 
a well-ordered society, each with its secure internal life, 
[which] tends to reduce the visibility, or at least the painful 
visibility in men’s prospects” (Rawls 1999, p. 470). Cus-
tomary philanthropic support for valued social institutions 
thus reduces envy and builds social solidarity. This is the 
argument developed by Heclo (2008), who holds that think-
ing institutionally, as opposed to thinking about institutions, 
leads citizens to support virtuous institutions that add value 
to the lives of the many not just the few, such as schools, 
hospitals, art museums, and community support organiza-
tions. It follows that customary philanthropy is respectful of 
existing institutions while embracing changes necessary to 
achieve social progress. Ameliorating the consequences of 
low pay, unemployment and natural disasters is illustrative; 
foodbanks being heir to the medieval tradition of alms giv-
ing, the better-off seeking to relieve the suffering of those in 
dire need. Customary philanthropy thus suggests that many 
individuals are driven to care through benevolence, satisfy-
ing obligations of beneficence by showing adequate concern 
for others (Ashford 2011).
The social embeddedness of elite actors motivated by 
good will toward others is fundamental to customary phi-
lanthropy. The obligation to give back is a disposition forged 
within families and community institutions (Avineri and de-
Shalit 1992), suggesting that customary philanthropists con-
tribute to the collective narratives they embrace (Macintyre 
1992; Maclean et al. 2015). Communitarian ethics stands 
squarely in opposition to individualism and neo-liberalism, 
holding that “exclusive pursuit of private interest erodes the 
network of social environments on which we all depend” 
(Bell 1993, p. 1), and that “it is morally good that the self be 
constituted by its social ties” (Avineri and de-Shalit 1992, 
p. 7). Etzioni (1995, p. 19) neatly encapsulates the commu-
nitarian idea of social justice in the phrase “each member of 
the community owes something to all the rest, and the com-
munity owes something to each of its members.” Customary 
philanthropy thus prizes social cohesion while tolerating the 
continued existence of inequalities. Putnam (2000) suggests 
that engaging in community life is by far the greatest driver 
of philanthropy, motivated not by self-interest, but by the 
desire to support those who have supported them (Ashford 
2011).
Crucial in this context is the right for the philanthropist 
to decide which causes to support (Eger et al. 2019). Phi-
lanthropy is over and above taxation, it is voluntary, and the 
generosity of donors would likely evaporate without per-
sonal identification with the causes supported. It is possible 
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therefore that some worthy causes may not be supported 
(Ashford 2011). This is thought unlikely by committed com-
munitarians, who argue that philanthropists in tune with 
community narratives are best placed to identify and com-
bat the most challenging social problems (MacIntyre 1992). 
In short, the politics of the common good, as opposed to 
common right, is foundational to customary philanthropy, 
placing obligations of justice and beneficence at its ethical 
core (Sandel 2010, 2012).
Ethics and Entrepreneurial Philanthropy
In stark contrast to the communitarian ethos of customary 
philanthropy, entrepreneurial philanthropy embraces indi-
vidualism. It is an outgrowth of advanced neo-liberalism and 
its ethical underpinnings correspond to those of the capabili-
ties school of ethics most closely identified with Sen (1993, 
2009) and Nussbaum (2011). The emphasis here is on the 
capabilities needed for people to achieve and flourish, and 
how these in turn are governed by “economic opportunities, 
political liberties, social powers, and the enabling condi-
tions of good health, basic education, and the encouragement 
and cultivation of initiatives” (Sen 1993, p. 5). It is argued 
that by removing or at least slackening the constraints that 
limit the development and exercise of capabilities, individu-
als might expand and exploit the opportunities available to 
them. Nussbaum (2011) builds on Rawls (2001) in arguing 
that social justice is best achieved by creating equality of 
opportunity for all.
Equal access to education, healthcare and food security 
is seen by Sen as fundamental if all humans are to flourish 
(Davis and McMaster 2015). Nussbaum (2000, pp. 76–78) 
goes further in listing ten central capabilities an individual 
must have to function effectively: life itself; bodily health; 
bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; 
practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control 
over immediate circumstances. Many of these capabilities 
might be developed or deliberately created through the pro-
vision of peace, education, training and livelihoods (Nuss-
baum 2011). She argues that we should aspire to a world in 
which all human beings have equal dignity wherein plurality 
is accepted. Global citizenship thus requires genuine empa-
thy and the willingness to act in support of others to create 
life-enhancing capabilities. The power of this approach lies 
in specifying what capabilities a person needs to compete 
on equal terms in the game of life.
Herein lies the central tenet of entrepreneurial philan-
thropy: creating the conditions in which individuals can 
prosper takes precedence over the provision of palliatives. 
Most particularly, the capabilities of disadvantaged mem-
bers of society must be enhanced so that they can compete 
as autonomous actors no longer beholden to others. The 
reflex of entrepreneurial philanthropists is thus to embrace 
market solutions to tackle problems arising from inequal-
ity and injustice. The application of market logics derived 
from wealth creation and applied in a philanthropic context 
is encapsulated in terms such as ‘philanthrocapitalism’ and 
‘philanthropreneurship’, which are often used to describe 
the philanthropic practices of wealthy entrepreneurs bent on 
driving transformational change (Bishop and Green 2009; 
Callahan 2017; McGoey 2012). The proactive and transfor-
mational orientation of entrepreneurial philanthropy invari-
ably involves the enactment of a viable theory of change; a 
declared means of solving a problem at source rather than 
simply offering relief from the consequences (Rogers 2014).
The origins of this approach can be traced back to 1889 
and the publication by wealthy industrialist and philanthro-
pist Andrew Carnegie of his essay The Gospel of Wealth 
(Putnam 2000; Harvey et al. 2011). Carnegie acknowledges 
that social and economic inequalities are a product of capi-
talist economic development, and that the concentration 
of wealth in the hands of the few is socially divisive. The 
solution he proposes is for entrepreneurs to invest in well-
conceived, sustainable social projects that create opportuni-
ties for upward social mobility. The ethically sound thing to 
do, he concluded, was for the rich to dispose of the entirety 
of their surplus wealth during their lifetimes by support-
ing schemes to help others rise in society (Bishop and 
Green 2009; Harvey et al. 2011). It is a narrative repeated 
and endorsed by present-day tech-entrepreneurs like Pierre 
Omidyar, Mark Zuckerberg, and the late Microsoft co-
founder Paul Allen (Callahan 2017). Likewise, the commit-
ment made by billionaire signatories of the Giving Pledge to 
dispose of at least half their wealth philanthropically bears 
testimony to the lasting impact of Carnegie’s ethical princi-
ples. The same principles are congruent with those of effec-
tive altruists like Singer (2009, 2015) and MacAskill (2015), 
who favour putting head before heart in the practice of phi-
lanthropy, preferencing causes and organizations proven to 
do the most good with a given quantum of resources. This 
resonates with the scientific, planned, results driven, quan-
tified and strategic logic of entrepreneurial philanthropy 
(Eikenberry and Mirabella 2018; McGoey 2012; 2015; Shaw 
et al. 2013).
As Sen argues (2009), social justice cannot be achieved 
simply by ensuring theoretical equality at the institutional 
level but must extend to the material factors that create the 
capacity for an individual to live a life of their own choosing. 
The emphasis here is on the capacity of the individual rather 
than on utility and equalizing the distribution of resources. 
In this, the capabilities approach to social justice is rooted 
in the ideas of political liberalism identified with philoso-
phers like Rawls (Rawls 1999, 2001; Nussbaum 2011). This 
explains its appeal to self-made entrepreneurs turned philan-
thropists, who in the broadest sense aspire to liberate people 
to achieve fulfilment through self-sufficiency. It is from this 
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starting point that they design, engage in and financially sup-
port transformational philanthropic interventions.
Entrepreneurial philanthropy is thus identified with the 
neo-liberal political ideology that has held sway in western 
countries since the 1980s (Harvey 2005; Sandel 2012). The 
ultimate solution to the related evils of poverty, ill-health, 
lack of education and low incomes in developing countries 
is not to issue handouts but to create thriving economies 
powered by private enterprise. Hence the emphasis placed 
on educational opportunity, skills training, knowledge 
transfer, micro-finance and new business creation, with the 
goal of equipping people to compete in an enlarged and all-
encompassing global economic system (Nickel and Eiken-
berry 2009; Eikenberry and Mirabella 2018; McGoey 2012). 
The sure and certain belief inspiring entrepreneurial philan-
thropy, notwithstanding evidence that capitalism pits win-
ners against losers, is that competition in unfettered markets 
is the only viable route to creating prosperity, liberty and a 
cohesive, fair society (Avnon and de-Shalit 1999; Harvey 
2005).
Methodology
Elite Philanthropy
Elite philanthropists, individuals who donate substantial 
sums to charitable causes, may predominantly be disposed 
to either customary or entrepreneurial philanthropy. They 
are identified here as high net worth individuals at the 
financial pinnacle of society who have donated to charita-
ble causes an average of a million pounds a year or more 
over a 5-year period or longer. There are relatively few of 
these in Britain. The annual Sunday Times Rich List ranks 
the 1000 wealthiest individuals and families by net worth in 
descending order. The list for 2017 includes 134 billionaires 
and collectively the top 1000 wealthiest British residents are 
estimated to own assets valued at £658 billion (The Sunday 
Times 2017). Less than a fifth of those on the Rich List (178) 
are included in the Giving List of the top 200 donors in the 
corresponding year (Charities Aid Foundation 2016). Some, 
of course, may have given substantially in previous years, 
and there are million pounds plus donors not included in the 
Rich List. The Coutts Million Pound Donors Report 2017 
records 310 donations of a million pounds plus with a total 
value of £1.83 billion. The same report provides a 10-year 
cumulative total of 2416 million pound plus donations worth 
£15 billion (Coutts Institute 2017).
Matched Sampling Procedure
In selecting elite philanthropists for interview, we were 
mindful of the need for variety in our dataset, ensuring a 
sufficient representation of both customary and entrepre-
neurial philanthropists. Generating a dichotomized statisti-
cally nonrepresentative matched sample is appropriate when 
interview numbers are small, and the need is to create a var-
ied sample for qualitative data analysis (Trost 1986). To this 
end, we created, based on publicly available information, a 
database tracking the activities of 320 British elite philan-
thropists over the decade 2008–2017. We classified each of 
these as either a customary (213) or an entrepreneurial (107) 
philanthropist based on three of the criteria enumerated in 
Table 1 for which we had complete data: revealed strategy 
(opportunity or theory-of-change driven), project selection 
(responsive or proactive), and project management (limited 
or extensive engagement). Given our primary interest in the 
ethics of entrepreneurial philanthropy, we decided to create 
a matching sample of 24 elite philanthropic actors—12 cus-
tomary and 12 entrepreneurial—willing to be interviewed 
about the motivational and ethical dimensions of their per-
sonal philanthropic journeys (Maclean et al. 2015). This 
sampling procedure is similar to that used by Hambrick and 
D’Aveni (1988) in their quantitative study of large corporate 
failures in which data on 57 bankrupt firms are matched 
by data on 57 survivor firms. Under this form of purposive 
non-random sampling, when the minority within a popula-
tion (entrepreneurial philanthropists) is of primary interest, 
the sample representing the majority (customary philanthro-
pists) effectively serves as a control group, enabling system-
atic comparisons to be made (Forgues 2012). We sought 
interviews through personal networks with committed phi-
lanthropists operating at scale through foundations they or 
other family members had established. All interviewees fall 
within the upper half of the giving distribution ranked by 
donations made between 2008 and 2017, 18 within the upper 
quartile, and 10 within the top decile. Several of those inter-
viewed are pre-eminent within UK philanthropy and play-
ers on the global philanthropic stage. All are white British, 
apart from one US citizen resident in Britain and one Asian 
British citizen. Their ages ranged from 39 to 71 at the time 
of interview, with a mean age of 55. Four interviewees are 
women.
Interviewing Philanthropic Elites
Interviewing was shared between two members of the 
research team using a semi-structured life-history tem-
plate (Miller 2000, pp. 85–103), moving as seamlessly as 
possible from life story to motivations, beliefs and ethics. 
One of the most powerful advantages of progressing from 
self-narration to self-explanation is that interviewees can 
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establish contexts, key events and turning points before 
engaging more deeply in processes of sense making and 
sense giving (Fontana and Frey 2008; Maclean et al. 2015). 
As Linde (1993, p. 98) puts it, “narrative is a significant 
resource for creating our internal, private sense of the self 
and is all the more a major resource for conveying that self 
to and negotiating that self with others.” We began with 
questions concerning participants’ early life, before docu-
menting their career histories, critical turning points and 
the transition to philanthropic engagement, including set-
backs and highlights, and concluding with questions regard-
ing ethical influences, values, beliefs, principles, dilemmas 
and satisfactions. All interviews, typically lasting between 
90 min and two hours, were recorded and transcribed, and 
participants accorded pseudonyms to ensure confidentiality 
as per protocol.
Data Analysis
Life-history interviewing provides researchers “with a tool 
with which to access the sense of reality that people have 
about their own world, giving ‘voice’ to that reality” reflex-
ively to “theorize and explain their past, present and future” 
(Musson 1998, pp. 10–11). Hence, we regard our interviews 
as the testimonies of knowledgeable actors who “know what 
they are trying to do and can explain their thoughts, inten-
tions, and actions” (Gioia et al. 2012, p. 17). In focusing 
on espoused ethical motivations, we follow Mills (1940) in 
reading motivations as rhetorical constructions serving the 
“social function of coordinating diverse actions” (p. 904), 
rather than as “external manifestations of subjective and 
deeper lying elements in individuals” (p. 913). Our purpose, 
therefore, is not to interpret the thoughts and feelings behind 
philanthropic actions, but to analyse how philanthropic 
actors “explain, justify, characterize, or interpret those 
actions”, individually and collectively (Benoit 1996, p. 70).
The first step in our analytical procedure was to explore 
near 180,000 words of interview data through the process 
of open coding (Corbin and Strauss 2015). This yielded 295 
text segments relating to ethics, labelled by 23 first-order 
terms. Taking a grounded approach to theorization, iterating 
between theory and data, while bearing in mind the need 
to avoid “being influenced by pre-existing conceptualiza-
tions” (Suddaby 2006, p. 635), the 23 first-order terms were 
distilled down to nine second-order ethical concepts during 
a second stage of coding, effectively grouping together con-
ceptually clustered first-order terms to create a manageable 
conceptual apparatus. To ensure reliability, coding was car-
ried out by two members of the research team, with differ-
ences discussed and reconciled at each stage. The emerging 
concept definitions and related ethical statement counts for 
customary and entrepreneurial philanthropists respectively 
are presented in Table 2.
To investigate systematically the similarities and differ-
ences in the ethical motivations of customary and entrepre-
neurial philanthropy, we next analysed the specific meanings 
or interpretations attributed to each of the nine second-order 
ethical concepts identified. These are expressed as two sets 
of summative statements—ethical concepts-in-use—in the 
second columns of Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Quotations 
from individual interviews are provided in each case to illus-
trate how ethical statements have been interpreted by the 
researchers. Next, following the Gioia method of theoreti-
cal refinement (Gioia et al. 2012), we aggregated the nine 
second-order concepts into three aggregate ethical dimen-
sions: formation, engagement and conduct. Again, these are 
Table 2  Ethical concepts and related statements in philanthropist interviews
Concepts Definitions Number of related statements
Customary 
philanthro-
pists
Entrepreneurial 
philanthropists
Ethical influence Individuals, groups or organizations that have helped shape the ethical beliefs of the phi-
lanthropist
16 14
Ethical stance Overarching ethical position that the philanthropist believes to be right and true 15 10
Ethical system Beliefs system referenced by the philanthropist as having a formative influence on their 
ethical stance
17 14
Ethical sensitivity Identification by the philanthropist of generalized social outcomes or processes they con-
sider unethical, unjust or unfair
11 16
Ethical trigger An event or encounter causing the philanthropist to engage in philanthropy 12 12
Ethical satisfaction Ethically satisfying thoughts and feelings derived from engagement in philanthropy 14 15
Ethical issue A problem or situation that the philanthropist considers wrong, which through a philan-
thropic intervention might be put right
16 20
Ethical dilemma Recognition by the philanthropist of difficult choices between competing moral imperatives 8 20
Ethical principle A rule or standard applied by the philanthropist in making philanthropic decisions 23 42
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found to differ significantly between customary and entre-
preneurial philanthropists, confirming the existence of two 
sets of espoused ethical motivations.
Findings
Our analysis proceeds on the basis that ethical statements 
made at interview are rhetorical constructions (Burke 
1969). Elite actors communicate personal narratives that 
are socially desirable, justifying their power and position 
(Maclean et al. 2012). Interviews are granted partly because 
philanthropists wish to persuade others of the virtuousness 
of their actions and motivations, drawing on vocabularies of 
motive, the “observable lingual mechanisms” used by groups 
of actors to situate and explain their actions (Mills 1940, 
p. 904). We compare the ethical statements of customary 
and entrepreneurial philanthropists on a concept-by-concept 
basis, as defined and enumerated in Table 2, to identify simi-
larities and differences in vocabularies of motive. For each 
of nine concepts, three per ethical dimension, we educe a 
subjective score on a three-point scale (low, moderate, high) 
of the degree of correspondence between the ethical state-
ments of customary and entrepreneurial philanthropists.
Ethical Formation
The term ethical formation refers here to the reasons given 
by elite philanthropists to explain their commitment to phi-
lanthropy, which we compare in terms of ethical influences, 
stances and systems. At stake here is authenticity. Authentic-
ity follows from popular acceptance that the philanthropist is 
concerned primarily with the welfare of others, not the self. 
Narratives of ethical formation serve this purpose.
Ethical Influences (High Correspondence)
Most interviewees (21/24) credit family members as their 
primary ethical influence. For example, Matthew (CP) says 
that “giving was endlessly demonstrated at home”; Gregory 
(CP) states that “doing good works is a family belief”; Lou-
ise (CP) describes how her family “put pennies for good 
causes into a jam jar on the table”; Ignacio (EP) claims that 
“generosity is in the family DNA”; Theo (EP) makes sure 
his “kids understand the values instilled by [his] and [wife’s 
name] parents and don’t see life as just about big houses, 
planes and boats”; and Wesley (EP) reports that his “moth-
er’s values are my values, without a doubt.”
Attributing motivation to family values is a strong rhetori-
cal move. Less is made of later influences like Harriet’s (CP) 
“longstanding membership of Greenpeace and Friends of the 
Earth”, Percival’s identification “with Carnegie and great 
liberal philanthropists like Rowntree, Cadbury, Lever and Ta
bl
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Boot”; or Matthew’s (CP) meeting with social entrepreneur 
Muhammad Yunis, which caused him to question whether 
“the entrepreneurial approach might be a much more fitting, 
respectful and empowering approach to world issues [than 
customary philanthropy].” For both types of philanthropist, 
it is simpler and more persuasive to attribute philanthropic 
dispositions to upbringing rather than learning.
Ethical Stances (Moderate Correspondence)
Interviewees identify with less fortunate others by deploring 
poverty and injustice. Patterson (EP) is typical in berating 
“shocking inequality … the money that people earn is scan-
dalous at one end and shocking at the other.” Customary phi-
lanthropists speak of feeling under an obligation to support 
people and places with whom they share a common heritage. 
Garrett (CP) says that he “should be giving back, I have been 
lucky and should be helping other people”; Harriet (CP) 
says there is no justification for “ridiculous levels of wealth, 
in having so much locked up in shares just sitting around.” 
Others agree with Gregory (CP), however, that “what we 
guard most fiercely is our independence … we really resent 
being told how to do it by anybody else.” In other words, 
customary philanthropists cherish their freedom to choose 
what causes to support and to what extent.
Entrepreneurial philanthropists go further. Not only do 
they believe in absolute freedom to select causes, but also 
in restricting giving to causes that help beneficiaries help 
themselves. Martin (EP) argues “there is just no point in giv-
ing people handouts.” As Ivan (EP) emphatically states, “We 
don’t give aid, we don’t give fish; we help people to catch 
fish.” It is commonplace that philanthropy should help peo-
ple to help themselves. This leads Wesley (EP), builder of 
state-of-the-art youth centres, to propose that “the currency 
we work in is confidence, that is what we’re investing in 
our kids, and that is the outcome.” Alexander (EP) says that 
“instead of giving my money to a cause full stop, I prefer to 
invest in something. I started a woman’s charity that is now 
independent and self-funding. That investment of £1 million, 
you know, it has been going twenty years, and it now has an 
earned income of £2.5 million a year, which is a fantastic 
return. It’s about using my money to leverage more.”
Ethical Systems (Moderate Correspondence)
None of our 24 interviewees name ethicists or philosophers 
as having a formative influence on them. Religious creeds 
feature more prominently. Nine customary philanthropists 
speak of religious ideas (Christian, Islamic, Jewish) as 
influential. For example, Garrett (CP), who “went to church 
every Sunday morning” still “subscribes to Christian val-
ues”; Abdullah (CP) acknowledges Islam as “a big influence 
in terms of world view”; Louise (CP) says that Christianity 
fashioned her “moral values”; Ignatius (CP) quotes from 
the Bible saying “do unto others as you would have them 
do unto you”; and Daniel acknowledges that his orthodox 
Jewish family is “more religious than many.”
The ethical thinking of entrepreneurial philanthropists 
is generally more secularized, although three interviewees 
spoke passionately about their Christian beliefs. Patterson 
(EP), for example, declares he is “motivated by [his] Chris-
tian faith” and that he gets on with “whatever he [God] 
shows me.” Percival (EP) reveals that “faith has been a very 
big part of [his] philanthropic journey and the motivation to 
give.” Both articulate their philanthropic missions as helping 
the poor to help themselves. For Patterson this means raising 
families “out of their malaise”; for Percival it means “help-
ing each person fulfil their potential” because “each person 
has God-given gifts and should have the opportunity to real-
ise them.” Religious beliefs are in this way neatly aligned 
with entrepreneurial beliefs in the necessity of self-initiative 
and agency, underscoring authenticity.
Ethical Engagement
The term ethical engagement is used here to describe how 
philanthropists reportedly identify and commit to favoured 
charitable causes, which we compare in terms of ethical sen-
sitivities, triggers and satisfactions. At stake here is trust. 
Establishing and maintaining trust is fundamental both to 
the reputation of philanthropy as an institution, and to the 
reputations of individual philanthropists. Narratives of ethi-
cal engagement serve this purpose.
Ethical Sensitivities (Moderate Correspondence)
Burke (1969, pp. 55–65) argues that identification with 
others is fundamental to rhetorical strategies. Emotional 
appeals convey empathetic understanding, as when Ignatius 
(CP) speaks of “people finding themselves in horrendous 
situations where maybe just two hundred quid [pounds ster-
ling] might get them out of a hole,” and when Gavin (CP) 
speaks of “caring for families confronted daily by drug tak-
ing and fights.” Rational appeals more often favoured by 
entrepreneurial philanthropists, in contrast, convey expert 
knowledge, as when Percival (EP) states that “in the average 
school we take over, only 19% of pupils gained five GCSEs 
at C or above, but we improve them at 11% per annum across 
the network … sixth formers now get into the best universi-
ties.” Both types of appeal increase identification and help 
in portraying philanthropy as a force for good.
Ethical Triggers (Moderate Correspondence)
Ethical triggers, as consequential life events, evoke at inter-
view strong emotional and rational motivational statements. 
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Nine customary philanthropists emphasize emotional moti-
vations. Gavin (CP), for example, says he became philan-
thropic after the death of his mother caused him to “feel 
vulnerable and wishing he did more to help others.” Daniel 
(CP) likewise says his father’s illness spurred him to support 
medical charities treating conditions caused by “smoking, 
drinking, drugs and so forth.” Garrett (CP) reports being 
so moved by his daughter’s suffering from a life-threat-
ening heart condition that he “created [his] foundation, to 
help other people who have similar issues and problems.” 
Three entrepreneurial philanthropists also gave emotionally 
impactful accounts of motivational incidents, as when a 
young boy told Jonathan (EP) that every time he moved to a 
new foster home “his clothes got put into a bin bag … what 
do you put in a bin bag? You put rubbish.”
Generally, however, the entrepreneurial philanthropists in 
our sample (7/12) offered rationally framed accounts of trig-
ger events. Patterson (EP), for example, explains his decision 
to set up a charity to support families following a visit to a 
young offenders’ institute where he “asked the Governor 
how many had been in care. She said 65%. I thought I must 
do something about that.” Theo (EP) says he became phil-
anthropic on learning that “30,000 children die of curable 
diseases every day and a billion people live on less than a 
dollar a day, which I just couldn’t comprehend. It was just 
instinctive to get involved.” Percival says his commitment 
began when serving on “a committee responsible for the 
annual [industry] awards when somebody said, ‘this is all a 
bit self-congratulatory, why don’t we make it for charity? It 
evolved as a group of people reaching conclusions through 
active debate.”
Ethical Satisfactions (Moderate Correspondence)
All interviewees speak of philanthropy as life affirming. 
Charmaine (CP) regards philanthropy as “just the most won-
derful thing”; Gavin (CP) finds it “unbelievably rewarding”; 
Louise considers it “empowering, satisfying and at times 
humbling”; Garrett, on seeing disabled children “write and 
read and listen to stories, listen to music and have a smile 
on their face makes you very happy”; and Ignacio (EP) says 
“it’s immeasurably satisfying seeing [disadvantaged] kids 
doing things they didn’t believe they could do.”
Speaking in warm terms about the satisfactions of giving 
is a rhetorical device intended to build trust in listeners. It 
is universal and readily accepted as a legitimate motivation 
for philanthropy. However, entrepreneurial philanthropists 
add to the basic formula the rational appeal of transforma-
tional outcomes. Isaac (EP) talks of “the thrill of another 
ten thousand people treated through robotic rather than open 
surgery,” adding that “they won’t know me, but I will have 
really accomplished something.” Jeanette (EP) says “you 
can sleep well at night knowing that 10,000 kids didn’t die 
because of you” but an even bigger “win is when you start 
to see spontaneous replication, when you start to see policy 
change.” Patterson (EP) claims “I kept going [reforming 
schools] because it benefited 5500 children. It was fantastic.”
Ethical Conduct
The term ethical conduct is used here to describe how phi-
lanthropists reportedly allocate and manage their philan-
thropic resources, which we compare in terms of ethical 
issues, dilemmas and principles. At stake here is approba-
tion. Continuation of the legal protections and fiscal advan-
tages philanthropists enjoy depends crucially on demon-
strating commendable philanthropic outcomes. Narratives 
of ethical conduct serve this purpose.
Ethical Issues (Low Correspondence)
Customary and entrepreneurial philanthropists speak in 
significantly different terms about the ethical issues said to 
motivate them. Customary philanthropists support charitable 
organizations in defined geographical areas, typically local, 
regional or national, combatting disadvantage close to home. 
Ignatius (CP) says his focus is on “supporting charities in 
deprived communities dealing with hardship.” Keenan (CP) 
says he was drawn to “homelessness and doing what he can 
to combat the huge housing crisis and housing affordabil-
ity issues.” Louise (CP) prioritises “environmental, health, 
deprivation, community development and educational issues 
within the region.” Abdullah (CP) says he is motivated to 
“combat extremism within the Muslim community by train-
ing young people in traditional Islamic sciences to immunise 
them, to inoculate them, against radical narratives.”
Just as ‘community’ is a pivotal word in the language 
of customary philanthropy, so the word ‘transformation’ is 
pivotal in the language of entrepreneurial philanthropy. Mar-
tin (EP) claims he is involved in micro-finance because “it 
is an offence to my intellect that poverty exists … imagine 
what can be done by releasing entrepreneurial talent in the 
developing world where just 3% of an estimated 500,000,000 
micro entrepreneurs have access to finance.” Jeannette (EP) 
speaks of transforming the life chances of children in devel-
oping countries by “researching areas that are fundamental 
[to] a child’s ability to survive, thrive and move on” and 
then initiating large-scale programmes and policy changes 
to deliver results. Percival’s stated “aim is to transform the 
whole mentality of people about what disadvantaged chil-
dren can achieve … [to] destroy the complacency which 
has marred the lives of generations of children in the UK.”
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Ethical Dilemmas (Moderate Correspondence)
Two main ethical dilemmas were raised at interview. First, 
when so much poverty exists, how do elite philanthropists 
justify retaining the greater part of their fortunes? The 
response of both customary and entrepreneurial philanthro-
pists is that giving is voluntary and what you give is a mat-
ter of personal choice. Garrett (CP) is typical in explaining 
that while he plans to give away a large proportion of his 
wealth, he “would never, ever (a) condemn those who don’t 
give, or (b) persuade them to do something … Their choice, 
they’ve earned their money.” Second, how do you choose 
one worthy cause while rejecting others? On this matter, 
customary and entrepreneurial philanthropists disagree. Cus-
tomary philanthropists admit to making subjective thematic 
choices about things that matter to them. Matthew (CP), 
for example, after learning about divest-invest philanthropy 
from a supporter decided straightway, “okay we’ve got to 
bloody get involved.” Entrepreneurial philanthropists, in 
contrast, state that they make choices deliberatively, only 
investing in transformative projects that “ultimately change 
the system” (Ignacio, EP).
Ethical Principles (Low Correspondence)
It is in stating ethical principles that elite philanthropists dif-
fer most. Customary philanthropists do not present grandiose 
visions but speak of supporting communities by “helping 
people by supporting grass roots voluntary organisations” 
(Gavin CP); of “staying close to home because there is 
enough to do without going abroad” (Louise CP); of “sup-
porting charities doing good work, delegating, having faith 
in them spending the money wisely” (Gregory CP); of want-
ing to “see tangible benefits rather than committing to things 
in places you cannot monitor” (Jamison CP); and of “trust-
ing charities to deliver without making it overly arduous for 
them to do so” (Harriet CP).
The language of entrepreneurial philanthropy is more 
challenging. The starting point is “rejection of charitable 
handouts” as these “achieve little and erode your char-
acter” (Martin EP). Rather, philanthropy should “focus 
on helping people help themselves” (Ivan EP) to “create 
long-term sustainable economic opportunities” (Duncan 
EP) by addressing “the root cause of the problem” (Theo 
EP). Then, “the single biggest thing is to be transforma-
tive, to improve the lives of the disadvantaged at scale” 
(Percival EP). This requires “measuring your impacts” 
(Wesley EP), “taking a partnership approach with gov-
ernments and other funders” (Theo EP), and “applying 
business principles to get a good return on philanthropic 
investments” (Jeanette EP).
Summation
The vocabularies of motives deployed rhetorically by cus-
tomary and entrepreneurial philanthropists are not exclu-
sive but overlapping. There are considerable overlaps in 
the vocabularies used to construct narratives of ethical 
formation and engagement, but few in narratives of ethical 
conduct. Each set of narratives—customary and entrepre-
neurial—serves to win approval in terms of authenticity, 
trust and approbation by identifying with others through a 
persuasive blend of emotional and rational appeals empha-
sizing social solidarity.
Discussion
We live today in an age of global inequalities (Piketty 
2014). Over the past four decades, inequalities of income 
and wealth have grown progressively in most of the world’s 
countries, developed and developing, although inequalities 
between countries have decreased (Atkinson 2015; Bour-
guignon 2015). In short, almost everywhere, the relativities 
between rich and poor have widened, which explains the 
prevalence of food banks in countries with high mean per 
capita incomes like Britain and the United States. Moreover, 
differences in income and wealth are mirrored in differences 
in education, health and well-being, those at the top enjoying 
more learning, longer lives and greater happiness (Bosworth 
2011, p. 382). Governments struggling to pay the bills have 
been unable to counteract these trends, leading some to give 
a cautious welcome to higher levels of philanthropic giving 
as a means of offsetting the socially divisive effects of rising 
inequalities (Bishop and Green 2009; Callahan 2017). Oth-
ers find virtue in the voluntary redistribution of wealth from 
rich to poor (Singer 2009; MacAskill 2015). Acs (2013, p. 
199) goes further in heralding “the coming golden age of 
philanthropy” wherein “the unequal distribution of wealth 
… creates the investments that lead to positive feedback 
loops of opportunity, innovation, and future prosperity.”
Our study makes a distinctive contribution to research on 
elite philanthropy. It is the first to identify and analyse the 
role of rhetoric in promoting the cause of elite philanthropy 
in both its customary and entrepreneurial forms. Elite phi-
lanthropy is heavily implicated in justifying extreme ine-
qualities, within and between nations, because it is through 
the persuasive use of ethically charged language that tolera-
tion of the status quo is increased. Elite philanthropists are 
the white knights of capitalism and vocabularies of motiva-
tions instrumental in the weaponization of philanthropy. As 
Mills (1940, p. 906) asserts, it is “through such vocabularies 
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[that] types of societal controls operate.” Ethically appealing 
philanthropic narratives are performative in demonstrating 
authenticity, generating trust and winning approbation. Cus-
tomary philanthropists speak of generosity and solidarity 
with disadvantaged individuals and communities; entrepre-
neurial philanthropists promise a new age of abundance with 
equal rights, opportunities and justice for all. The effect is 
to wrongfoot opposition to domination by further elevating 
the status of the wealthy.
In uncovering the co-existence of two complementary 
vocabularies of philanthropic motivations, we lay the foun-
dations for further critical theorization of the rise of elite 
philanthropy and its effects. Customary philanthropists 
claim strongly to identify with the communities from which 
they emerged and to which they express the desire to give 
back (Maclean et al. 2013). They claim a high degree of 
solidarity with familiar and valued institutions like churches, 
schools, universities, hospitals, art galleries, museums and 
community groups, ostensibly seeing it as their duty to sup-
port others less fortunate. Entrepreneurial philanthropists, in 
contrast, claim to be motivated by more ambitious, transfor-
mational goals (Dietlin 2010). For them, it is not enough to 
fund established causes and institutions; rather, they support 
market-based reforms and apply business methods to solve 
social problems (Brainard and La Fleur 2008).
Ethical theory is helpful in explaining these differences. 
Communitarian ethics is predicated on a rejection of indi-
vidualism, whether in its stronger or weaker forms (Bell 
1993). Since people are rooted in communities, they incur 
obligations to one another in a system of collective respon-
sibilities of which charitable endeavours form an integral 
part (Ashford 2011; Putnam 2000). Fairness and justice, as 
desirable social goals, cannot be attained simply through the 
promotion of individual rights, something more is needed: 
collective interventions to countermand the consequences of 
individualistic processes. The same ethical logic is at play 
when customary philanthropists express a duty of care to 
communities and valued institutions. This is not a socialist 
manifesto. Customary philanthropists accept inequalities of 
income and wealth as a natural and even desirable outcome 
of economic forces, but that duty demands that the wealthy 
exhibit an adequate concern and beneficence toward others. 
Freedom in the selection of philanthropic causes is a funda-
mental right, necessary to keeping funds flowing, and central 
to the ethos of customary philanthropy (Eger et al. 2019). 
At bottom, the ethos and purpose of customary philanthropy 
is ameliorative and conservative, accepting that persistent 
inequalities are part of the natural order of society (Rawls 
1999, pp. 468–474).
Entrepreneurial philanthropy, likewise, does not pursue 
equal outcomes as a desirable ethical goal. Indeed, it goes 
much further in disavowing Rawls’ (1999) idea that in a 
well-ordered society—“one designed to advance the good 
of its members and effectively regulated by a public concep-
tion of justice” (p. 397)—“the spread of income and wealth 
should not be excessive” (p. 470). Rather, its radicalism, 
following Carnegie (1889), lies in the idea of multiplying 
opportunities for personal gain as the ultimate philanthropic 
goal. In this, it offers a radical extension of the capabili-
ties approach to ethics of Sen (2009) and Nussbaum (2011). 
Hence the focus on health and education, especially of chil-
dren, as a pre-requisite for accessing economic opportuni-
ties. Beyond this basic, short-term objective, however, is 
the goal of creating more entrepreneurs, more enterprises, 
and a more all-encompassing global economic system, free 
of commercial restrictions and governed by neo-liberal 
principles and institutions (Eikenberry and Mirabella 2018; 
Giridharadas 2019; McGoey 2012; 2015; Nickel and Eiken-
berry 2009). Underpinning this transformational intent is the 
conviction that open markets and entrepreneurs offer a better 
solution to problems of economic and social development 
than do governments and bureaucrats (Horvath and Powell 
2016).
What is perhaps most surprising in our own findings is 
the high degree of in-group consistency between the ethical 
narratives of customary and entrepreneurial philanthropists, 
respectively. Unique stories and ethical insights are found 
in each of the 24 interviews but, illuminating details apart, 
all narratives conform to one of two readily accessible rhe-
torical templates, each with its own vocabulary of motives 
(Mills 1940). At the heart of both is a myth, a social stereo-
type passed off as part of the natural order of things (Barthes 
1957). On the one hand, individual narratives of customary 
philanthropy emphasize the duty of beneficence that comes 
with wealth, promoting the “myth of generosity”. On the 
other hand, individual narratives of entrepreneurial philan-
thropy underscore the creation of opportunities for social 
inclusion, promoting the “myth of transformational social 
change”. These myths are complementary and have power-
ful real-world effects. The myth of generosity condones the 
economic and social status quo, naturalizing existing divi-
sions and distinctions. The myth of transformational change, 
of creating a world of equal opportunities for all, shores up 
the continued existence of profound difference in the distri-
butions of income and wealth. It holds out the promise of a 
new age of equality, always prospective but never emerging. 
The incessant repetition of these myths, we contend, implicit 
in the persuasive and ethically charged narratives of both 
customary and entrepreneurial philanthropists, blindsides 
and confounds the critics of elite philanthropy, perpetuating 
iniquity by disguising the fact of “inequality as the disease 
behind injustice” (Dorling 2011, p. 310).
Amable (2011, p. 5) argues “that neo-liberalism is based 
on the idea that the ideal world order should be a ‘free’ 
and ‘fair’ competition between individuals.” It is, accord-
ing to Harvey (2005, p. 2), “a theory of political economic 
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practices that proposes that human well-being can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by 
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.” 
Considered thus, entrepreneurial philanthropy is a powerful 
force for the advancement of individualism, entrepreneuri-
alism and the neo-liberal project, promoting the growth of 
the private sector at the expense of the public sector through 
such means as privatization and the outsourcing of govern-
ment services. The upshot has been that power and resources 
have become ever more concentrated in the hands of rent-
seeking financial, corporate and entrepreneurial elites that 
have won for themselves ever larger shares of income and 
wealth, effectively scooping up the fruits of economic 
growth, leaving many governments starved of resources and 
compelled to increase debt and cut public services (Piketty 
2014; Stiglitz 2012). It is paradoxical that entrepreneurial 
philanthropy, while on the one hand promoting universal 
access to sustenance, healthcare and education, is on the 
other hand inextricably wedded to the inequality-inducing 
cause of neo-liberalism.
Conclusion
We urge researchers and policymakers to beware of the rhe-
torically charged motivational narratives of elite philanthro-
pists. Narratives of philanthropic formation, engagement and 
conduct are intended to persuade others to condone the argu-
ments they embrace. Burke (1969, pp. xiii–xiv) observes that 
“a man who identifies his private ambitions with the good 
of the community may … be using a mere pretext to gain 
individual advantage at the public expense; yet he might be 
quite sincere, or even may willingly make sacrifices in behalf 
of such identification.” Whether or not individual philan-
thropists are cynical or sincere is hard to determine since 
they routinely draw on standard vocabularies of motives 
current in elite circles. Customary philanthropy, in cham-
pioning voluntary redistribution in support of good causes, 
is relatively unproblematic. Entrepreneurial philanthropy is 
altogether more problematic. It is ethically motivated not 
by the immediate desire to even things up materially, but to 
equalize access to opportunities for wealth creation within 
capitalistic free market economies. As such, entrepreneurial 
philanthropy is ideologically committed to neo-liberalism, 
tolerant of inequalities and supportive of current trends. We 
conclude that entrepreneurial philanthropy, as an ostensibly 
efficacious instrument of social justice, is ethically flawed by 
its unremitting impulse toward ideological purity.
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